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1. Introduction 
Heinrich Rickert contended in his Philosophy of Life, which is a critique of what 
he considered »modish« life-philosophy (Lebensphilosophie), that «historical 
philosophy does not exist« and that the historical is merely the contingent raw 
material for philosophy to be excluded in its systematization.1 Rickert dismissed 
the historical as accidental, heterogeneous, and particular, in contrast with the 
necessity, unity, and universality of value and validity. From this perspective, 
he accused Dilthey of being a »life-philosopher« who turned a lack of principles 
into the ultimate principle and undermined rationality by denying that there is 
intelligibility and meaning independent of the natural and historical world.2 
Diverging from the dominant Neo-Kantianism and Positivism of his era, 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s works engaged, articulated, and opened up the historical for 
reflection, as his writings indicate an endeavor to enact historical research with 
a philosophical intent while interpreting philosophy in relation to its historical 
referential context.3 Philosophy is inevitably historical for Dilthey in being 
informed by and responding to its times. It is not historical in being lost in the 
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plural, the particular, and the contingent, as Rickert worried, but by 
encountering the present and engaging it in experience and reflection. 
Frithjof Rodi has described Dilthey’s strategy as a »synergetic analysis,« which 
articulates overlapping tendencies in their plurality and tension rather than 
reducing them to an abstract identity.4 Dilthey did not offer a conventional or 
anti-philosophical »history of ideas« that only categorizes positions and views, 
since his strategy was to reopen thought to its lived experiential and reflective 
as well as its worldly and social-historical horizons. This paper focuses on two 
questions that can be asked of Dilthey’s historical strategy: What does history 
signify in the context of Dilthey’s critique and transformation of previous 
»philosophy of history« and why is historicity crucial to what he called the task 
of self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung)? 
It is well-known that Dilthey described his project as a »critique of historical 
reason«, and the inaccurate interpretation of Dilthey as an advocate of 
irrationalism or mere life-philosophy has been corrected multiple times. In this 
paper, I contend that Dilthey developed an alternative account of rationality by 
prioritizing self-reflection in relation to its experiential life-contexts and 
consequently of articulating a critical model of a historical, immanent, and this-
worldly rationality. This model does not suppress the heterogeneous and 
contingent character of human existence. Nor does it exclude the affective and 
the bodily dimensions of human life, without which understanding cannot 
occur, although individual existence and social life are not only formed on the 
basis of affective and bodily life and experience. It is reflection, when it 
recognizes the non-conceptual and non-cognitive, which allows them to be 
heard and articulated; that is, if they are heard and addressed at all. 
Dilthey describes how elemental experiences are not self-transparent intuitions 
insofar as they already involve − through self-reflexivity − understanding, 
interpretation, and expression as well as self-reflection. These processes are not 
merely »cognitive« or »intellectual« such that they could be denounced or 
excluded from philosophy and the human sciences in order to celebrate pure 
life, intuition, or experience as such. Nor can self-reflection be seen as the core 
of the self, as interiority, as it is simultaneously a reflection tied up with the 
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world and the claims of reality on the self.5 Human life is autobiographical and 
hence self-reflective in relation to others, its world, and itself. The seemingly 
natural and ontological categories of life and intuition are themselves shaped in 
and by human practices, formations, and contexts, and depend on history, 
language, and society through human self-expression, stylization, and 
conceptualization. 
The human sciences presuppose a response to the question of self and society, 
and are implicated in the very formations of identity that they study. The human 
sciences are connected from the beginning − whether acknowledged or not − to 
the reality of and possibilities for self-knowledge. Since the self is a formative 
and acquired nexus for Dilthey, such knowledge is experiential and reflective 
yet cannot avoid the work of understanding and interpretation. It has been 
impacted by others and accordingly cannot only be an issue of a self that is 
transparent to itself through the light of intuition or reason. Instead, self-
reflection leads to interpretive and empirical inquiry into the individual and 
social-historical life nexus (Lebenszusammenhang) in which I participate and of 
which I am to some extent a conscious co-agent.6 In advocating a self-reflection 
that is not merely private or subjective and the auto-biography that more or less 
directly expresses the self-reflection of a life7, Dilthey’s hermeneutics radically 
diverges − as Gadamer himself notes − from one that contends that the »self-
awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life.«8 
Like Gadamer, Theodor Adorno criticizes Dilthey for overemphasizing 
individuals and their differences.9 Dilthey recognized and articulated the 
impersonal forces and dimensions of social-historical life such as custom, habit, 
and tradition as well as the material and economic reproduction of society. One 
example of this is that, while rejecting what he considered his overly abstract 
and radical approach to society, Dilthey could praise the structural analysis of 
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capitalism in Karl Marx’s Das Kapital.10 By employing objectivating third-
person perspectives, the individual can always be analyzed and explained as a 
continuation of the past, as embodying natural and biological tendencies, or as a 
functional component and tool of the social tendencies and historical traditions 
to which it belongs. Dilthey did not exclude these strategies from the human 
sciences even as he disputed the claim asserting their exclusivity or 
absoluteness in interpreting social-historical life. Nor did Dilthey abandon 
examining the impersonal structural and ontological dimensions of social-
historical life in his own research, which he designated the external organization 
of society. Nonetheless, the individual can be considered in relation to and from 
out of its own first-person perspective, which is already dialogical and other-
related through the interconnection of »I« and »you«, as a participating co-agent 
in social life. This first-person perspective of understanding is in fact 
presupposed by »all further operations of the human sciences«.11 As a human 
science, history assumes understanding between persons, i.e., between self and 
other, insofar as not only its objects but its contents, its activity, and its 
knowledge falls and operates within social life. 
The human sciences originate for Dilthey in the self-reflection of ordinary 
social life and in reflection on the contexts and conditions of that life.12 Human 
scientific inquiry is necessarily self-reflexive, insofar as one studies oneself, and 
empirical to the degree that the self does not transparently know itself and its 
social relations through consciousness alone. The human sciences presuppose 
the potential truth and validity of the first person perspective of self-reflexive 
agents while simultaneously needing to go beyond the ordinary self-
understandings of individuals in examining the processes and structures to 
which every social agent is to some degree or another subjected and as a result 
shaped as a subject of a particular life-nexus. As a crossing of multiple social 
tendencies, the individual expresses that life-nexus while transforming it by 
living and enacting it in its own manner. Socialization and individuation are 
bound together, and this double need indicates why Dilthey should be read as 
justifying both a hermeneutics of the self-interpretations of persons in the 
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context of social-historical life as well as structural-functional analysis and 
causal explanations of that life. The human sciences require the multiplication 
of perspectives of interpretation and explanation while, nevertheless, 
prioritizing experience, understanding, and interpretation in socially and 
historically informed self-reflection. 
Knowing is not an isolated private and subjective condition of the individual’s 
interiority or intuition for Dilthey, it is worldly and interpersonal from the start. 
Knowledge of human affairs is constituted and reshaped by the lived 
experiences and practical interests of the individuals and groups of social life. 
History, as experienced and as inquiry, is accordingly neither accidental nor a 
hindrance to knowledge, as it is its very medium. Likewise, experiences and 
practices are not fallen manifestations of ideas, norms, and values that have a 
validity and intelligibility of their own but are the context and content of their 
enactment and occurrence. Historical research and the human sciences cannot 
then exclude the facticity of life for the sake of ideal validity without missing 
their very orienting question and concern − the interpretive and empirical 
encounter with the concrete particularity and multiplicity of human existence in 
oneself and others. 
2. Dilthey between Hegel and Heidegger? 
The »philosophy of history« has fallen into disrepute to the extent that it has 
been identified with the ability to know, predict, and produce history (what Karl 
Popper inaccurately calls »historicism«) or the positing and construction of a 
comprehensive totality that would justify the course of history, including its 
brutality, cruelty, and terror, in the name of a greater good or, as in Hegel, for 
the sake of the present.13 However, even according to Hegel, who notoriously 
seems to lack sympathy for the particular, and for whom history is theodicy;14 
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»Yet what experience and history teach us is this, that nations and governments 
have never learned anything from history, nor acted in accordance with the 
lessons to be derived from it. Each era has such particular circumstances, such 
individual situations, that decisions can only be made from within that era 
itself.«15 
Hegel maintained both the historical conditionality and particularity of an era as 
well as history having a more vital sense and significance such that the present 
is where the absolute occurs. In a passage, which might at first glance evoke 
Hegel’s statement, Dilthey notes the basic facticity of history; »But that is 
precisely the lesson of history: In its deepest concerns, the human race really 
has no inkling of the way the barriers of historical conditions enclose its life.«16 
Whereas for Hegel the conditional and unconditional always stand in a complex 
relationship of mediation, Hegel’s certainty, faith, and underlying principle of 
identity concerning the historical is lacking in Dilthey. Dilthey did not identify 
an absolute in history, and refused the »magical formula« of identity that would 
resolve the tension of being and thinking.17 He nonetheless argued that the 
present is not the limit of historical interpretation and for the reality of 
conceptual and scientific progress.18 Conceptualization and idealization 
necessarily move away from the facticity of immanent historical life through 
generalization and universalization while not escaping or transcending its own 
historical life-nexus, including relations of power.19 
History is not simply the scientific study of a set of objectively given facts or 
objects of research. Historical research is only practicable because human life is 
already fundamentally historical.20 This difference, which for Dilthey compels 
the relation between history as science and history as facticity, would be taken 
up by Heidegger as the distinction between historiography or the science of 
history (Historie) and history as enactment, occurrence, and event 
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(Geschichte).21 Whereas Heidegger alternatively sought to reformulate or reject 
Historie in the name of Geschichte, a movement culminating in the history of 
Being (Seinsgeschichte), Dilthey focused on illuminating the intertwinement of 
historical research and historical lived-experience through the moment of self-
reflection and interpretation. »Ontic history« is not in danger of being 
submerged in the ontological history of being, nor historical research replaced 
by philosophical history as seems to be in the case of Heidegger.22 
In Dilthey’s thinking of the historical, by contrast, the historicity of »originary 
history« cannot be separated from the contingent, empirical, and ontic character 
of self-reflection on history which is the basis of the discipline or science of 
history. The academic study of history is called forth by the interruptions and 
lack of transparency of historical self-understanding and memory. Originary 
history is already inherently singular-plural for Dilthey. The multiplicity of 
historical forces and facticities, their incommensurability and conflict, 
undermines any identity or unity of history, whether history is understood as 
factical historicity or the human science of history.23 
3. History as Facticity, Art, and Science 
Early in the Introduction to the Human Sciences, Dilthey criticized unifying 
approaches to historical life by showing the relatedness of facticity, the 
incommensurability of perspectives and sources, and the immanent and inherent 
limits to experience and knowledge.24 Resistance and reversal, the singular and 
the whole, are modes of facticity, which inform Dilthey’s conception of history 
and the human sciences, since they indicate the finitude of historical life and the 
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inherent limits of experience and knowledge.25 And yet humans access facticity 
and history as factical-historical beings. 
Because history is factical, the study of history is not simply the study of human 
consciousness and its worldly manifestations. Consciousness, as we have seen, 
is already worldly and historical; the self is entwined in facticity. In this case, 
the historical self as participant and co-agent in history is referred beyond itself 
to its contexts and conditions. Dilthey’s »individualism« focused on the 
contextual individual in history rather than constructing history by means of the 
abstraction of the atomistic individual.26 The social-historical formation of 
human life in its facticity cannot simply be derived from a theoretical account of 
human nature, insofar as the former inherently involves the perspective of an 
active participant confronting its own facticity rather than the attitude of a 
contemplative observer.27 The latter approach fails to meet the goal of 
knowledge in the human sciences, which in the end is not the universal but the 
singular and unique.28 This appreciation of the singular is crucial because, 
according to a principle of the immanence and self-formation of meaning and 
value, »each life has its own sense.«29 
Because of its concern for the unique (Einmaligen) and because the observer 
falls within the observed, the praxis of history addresses a responsive practice or 
art. The human science of history is as much an art as a science such that it 
cannot be reduced to the status of a science.30 History cannot be a science which 
reduces art to method, lived-experience to rules, and the singular to the 
universal. It is rather an art which incorporates scientific reflection and 
methods. Yet, contrary to Gadamer’s criticism, Dilthey rejected as inadequate 
an artless rule-based hermeneutics.31 For hermeneutics and the study of history, 
method cannot suffice without lived experience32; nor can knowledge occur 
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without art.33 Dilthey noted the importance of method to inquiry while arguing 
for the pragmatic conditions, the plurality and flexibility of methods in the 
human sciences.34 This is because of Dilthey’s suspicion of a general 
explanatory method applied to all aspects of history. Methods can only be 
evaluated through their application and results.35 It is the task of inquiry itself, 
how the object presents itself in its givenness, which determines methodology in 
the human sciences rather than a unified theoretical standpoint.36 Because of its 
basis in experience and an informed practice (art), history responds to the 
empiricity (Empirie) and facticity that addresses human agents. History is 
therefore inherently empirical and reflective in presupposing experience and art 
without, however, abandoning the possibility of extending itself through theory. 
History is inevitably narrative in that it explores, reproduces and transforms the 
narrative processes and structures of historical life. Life is not merely given or 
exhausted in its »givenness.« It occurs as understood and interpreted through 
narrative and in relation to the interruption of narrative. The need for narrative, 
which is not fulfilled in art or science, is fulfilled in the human sciences which 
concern themselves not with facts or events isolated from their narrative and 
life-contexts but with the narrative processes and structures of human 
experience, particularly biography and history. History originates not in the 
event but in the expectations, experiences, and memories of the event. That is, 
in the telling of the event, which indicate the need for narrative self-
understanding and enactment as an articulation of human experience in its 
historical life.37 The writing of history is a free narrative art rather than a 
conceptual system of laws and propositions. Both the science of history and 
factical history resist the status of a unified theory, whether metaphysical-
speculative or causal-deductive. 
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History as an art, concerned with the bond between the singular and the 
universal38, can only partially narrate and reflect aspects of a vast totality; it can 
only recover remnants of the stratified past.39 History is scientific insofar as it 
has scientific-empirical means of studying the past through documents and 
statistics.40 History is artistic since − like art − it demands the employment of 
the imagination and ingenuity of the historian.41 The historian cannot proceed 
through conceptual thought alone as »there is no understanding apart from a 
feeling of value,« and the practice of history »requires a feeling for the power of 
the unique and a sense for inner connections among ideas.«42 
History demands the formation of feeling and sense on the part of the historian 
and yet it cannot simply remain with that feeling and sense since it is confronted 
by the distance and interval that undermines the self-presence of intuition and 
contemplation. Dilthey thus criticized limiting interpretation to »an aesthetic 
sensibility that grasps the whole in feeling, but finds itself incapable of 
reproducing it intelligibly. . .«43 This lack of linguistic and conceptual 
mediation, which is the only way we have of knowing ourselves or the world, is 
in fact the failure of the historical school: »Historical vision and comparative 
procedures by themselves are incapable of establishing an autonomous system 
of the human sciences or of exerting any influence on life.«44 Because the 
historical school lost itself in the particular, Dilthey sought to articulate its 
philosophical and theoretical basis.45 History, and the art and practice of human 
scientific inquiry in general, cannot avoid the necessity of theoretical 
reflection.46 
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History is inherently both art and science, a narrative practice informed by 
methodological empirical inquiry. History as art and science can be taken up 
self-reflectively by the historian, yet history is bound to both its artistic and 
scientific conditions. History cannot, given its contexts and conditions, recover 
the past or predict and form the future as presence, it cannot overcome the 
distance which is its own condition. The factical historicity of human life does 
not only make historical social and self knowledge possible through self-
reflection and empirical inquiry, but it already implicates the project of 
knowledge in its own impossibility as a unifying cognitive system. 
Metaphysical and speculative approaches to the philosophy of history are 
problematized by the very facticity, multiplicity and singularity of historicity. 
Dilthey emphasizes the fragility of systematization, as historical reflection and 
inquiry cannot exhaust the historicity and facticity of human life.47 
4. Dilthey’s Critique of Identity: Philosophy of History and 
Sociology 
»[...] the boundless ambiguity of the material of history became evident. This 
showed the futility of the teleological principle of historical knowledge.« − 
Wilhelm Dilthey48 
»My attack on sociology thus cannot be directed against a discipline of this sort  
[i.e., the science of social organizations], but is rather aimed at a science that 
seeks to comprehend in one science everything which occurs de facto within 
human society. Such comprehension would be based on the following principle: 
Whatever occurs within human society in the course of its history must be 
integrated into the unity of one and the same object.« − Wilhelm Dilthey49 
 
Dilthey recognized the legitimate use of categories such as identity, totality and 
unity in ordinary life and the sciences. However, Dilthey developed arguments 
against the reification of identity, systematic totality and unity in metaphysics, 
the philosophy of history and Comte’s sociology. These arguments are not 
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simply a rejection of synthetic and constructive unities but are positive in 
articulating the significance and value of the singular and the individual in life 
and for the formation of the human sciences. Dilthey’s anti-reductive motif runs 
against the tendencies of the philosophy of history, sociology and unified 
science by asserting the complexity of the sense of history.50 It is not the 
speculative-metaphysical philosophy of history or a totalizing social science 
that can elucidate the historicity of human life. Dilthey argued post-
metaphysically that it is in fact the human sciences that are the sole means for 
explaining history.51 He argued further for the plurality of the human sciences, 
the inherent multiplicity of their methods and objects, against Comte’s vision of 
a unifying science of positive sociology.52 It is the ambiguity and materiality of 
history itself that undermines the metaphysical basis and claims of the 
philosophy of history and the totalizing sociology of the positivism of Comte.53 
Dilthey argued for a thorough methodological pluralism against the claims of 
integrating metaphysics or science from his early to later thought. What are the 
reasons for resisting the systematizing unity of cognitive thought and why is this 
resistance not irrelevant? 
Against the »Platonism« of metaphysics, Dilthey argued that the 
unfathomability of the world shows that every system is one sided. Dilthey goes 
further than noting the fact of the disagreement of metaphysical systems to 
criticize the metaphysical tradition itself. In an early note, Dilthey suggested: 
»The thought that the logos is present in humans is diametrically opposed to my 
approach. This parousia has become through [...] Plato and Christianity the 
middle point of German philosophy.«54 This historical and critical approach to 
metaphysics would be developed in the Introduction to the Human Sciences as 
the impossibility of redeeming metaphysics and the necessity for empirical-
experiential inquiry. 
According to the young Dilthey, the whole cannot be explained, whether as 
nature or history, and there is no need to constitute a whole, least of all as it has 
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been done in the philosophy of history.55 Dilthey distinguished from early on 
the difference in kind between the whole as context (Zusammenhang) and as an 
abstract constructed system. The latter isolates aspects of the former in order to 
achieve an ahistorical abstract conception of the whole. Dilthey differentiated 
the contextual whole from the abstract systematic whole, for example, in a 
discussion of the holism of early modern hermeneutics.56 The whole is known 
through partial systems, which in isolation face the danger of false abstraction. 
Because thought is not self-contained and cannot constitute itself as a whole 
without aporia and antinomy, excess and remainder, there is no measure by 
which to separate and isolate the empirical and the philosophical.57 The 
conceptually constructed whole is always referred to further contexts that it has 
not produced. In this sense, Dilthey denied the assertion of the identity of the 
true and the made or the known and the produced, since − for example − »there 
is more than knowledge in a poem or in a letter of St. Paul«.58 
Metaphysical and speculative philosophy of history assumes the intelligibility 
of a temporal whole that can be conceptually known in a systematic function. 
Even the more reflective conception of history argued for by Kant, which 
undermined the finality of history for a reflectively posited goal which could be 
posited by self-developing humanity, still presupposed the duality of what is 
(the empirical human being) and what ought to be (the ideal of humanity) and 
its mediation through and as history.59 Although Kant was one of the first to 
allow history into his philosophical thought without reducing it to formulas, 
Kant’s conception of history did not go far enough in understanding the 
practical and ethical from out of historical practical life.60 Kant had begun to 
show the way of understanding history responsively from out of itself, although 
Dilthey concludes that Kant − like the Neo-Kantians who followed him − did 
not overcome the residues of metaphysical duality between the intelligible and 
the sensible. 
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History has sense and significance immanent in itself. The inherent significance 
of history and life emerges in relation its ambiguity, indeterminacy, and 
plurality, and in the recognition of the possible non-intelligibility of life − since 
life is both significant and unfathomable in its immanence. The pretheoretical 
significance of life, a thesis which powerfully resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body, does not exclude but emerges from facticity.61 The 
facticity of life implies for Dilthey both the precognitive significance of the life-
nexus and the self-distanced interrupted character of life. Dilthey thus rejected 
the teleological-metaphysical presupposition of the inherent intelligibility of the 
world insofar as life is both always already significant and bound to what resists 
and disturbs sense and significance. 
The purposive character of lived experience does not imply teleological finality, 
either for the individual or the species. The purposes which emerge from the 
practical interests of historical life are reified in the teleology or philosophy of 
history, in its idea of a pre-given determinate goal or even more open and 
indeterminate teleologies that still reflectively affirm one goal of development 
and progress. Dilthey advocated the potential for progress but showed its 
unstable and fragile character by arguing for its relative character. The empirical 
and interpretive investigation of formation and development in history does not 
allow the demonstration of the realization of a teleological goal or a necessary 
progress.62 Progress as such can not be proved.63 Nor is it an appropriate ideal 
insofar as it judges every culture and epoch according to the standard of one’s 
own present. The idea of progress undermines the possibility of being receptive 
to the address of what is other than oneself in subordinating the other to the 
finality of a developmental schema. Dilthey challenged this argument, for 
example, in Schleiermacher’s placement of Christianity at the height of a 
historical-developmental schema that subordinated all other religions. He would 
question the exclusivity of progress from his early reading of Schleiermacher to 
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his later thinking of the irresolvable plurality and conflict of worldviews and 
perspectives.64 
The philosophy of history had imposed principles and formulas abstracted from 
aspects of life back onto that life as a whole. Instead of this reifying strategy, 
which denied the very facticity of life, Dilthey argued for an immanent strategy 
of responsively understanding history and its movements through and out of 
historical life itself. Life is already significant before it is explicitly or 
conceptually known even as language and thought are required to articulate and 
reflect on that sense and significance. Human life can be articulated as 
significant prior to knowledge and, further, that knowledge of human life 
already depends upon and occurs within the significance and nexus of ordinary 
human life. In the human sciences, especially history, the objects of inquiry are 
»already known« (bekannt) in the sense of being understood before they are 
conceptually cognized in Erkenntnis.65 Understanding therefore precedes and 
provides the basis for the conceptual cognition (Erkenntnis) which potentially 
transforms it. The bekannt is the basis for the erkannt and yet the former can 
enact a transformation of the latter. 
Historical knowledge presupposes the understanding of a historical being in 
which there is an interdependence of fact and law, reality and meaning, feeling 
of value and rule. These are already active in human life and come to be 
recognized only in self-reflection.66 The self-reflection of a being related 
interpretively to its world is the basis of conceptual cognition. The individual is 
not an isolated single existence enclosed within its representational 
consciousness or egoity. It is instead a complex and a complexity that includes 
and is related to the feelings of life of others, society, and even nature.67 
There is a sense of the whole in the individual beginning with the cogivenness 
of self and world. This whole, however, can never be made fully intelligible and 
systematized in concepts without the excess and remainder that forces such 
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systems into aporia and antinomy. There is then some legitimacy in Husserl and 
Rickert’s criticism of Dilthey’s »skepticism.« The young Dilthey himself called 
his approach a »moderate skepticism« which had the suspension of hypothetical 
explanation as a consequence.68 It is not the modern skepticism of Descartes and 
unconditional doubt that we find at work in Dilthey’s works. It is more akin to 
the ancient skepticism that doubted knowledge and theory in order to affirm the 
value of practical social-historical life. Nevertheless, the skepticism charge is 
incorrect since it assimilated Dilthey’s »life-philosophy« to the modern method 
of universal doubt and Dilthey never did deny the validity and value of 
knowledge but sought to investigate its context in human life. 
Philosophy of history and positive sociology attempted to constitute a totalizing 
whole out of the multiplicity of social-historical life. As such, it enacts a closure 
rather than an opening of the possibilities of life. It is an attempt to limit and 
master its virtuality and singular/plural structure- and event-character. 
Interpretive reflection (Besinnung) has a worldly and bodily reference insofar as 
sense (Sinn) is related to the sensual (sinnlich). This is a thesis that Neo-
Kantians such as Rickert deny not in the name of the duality of mind and body 
but rather of facticity and validity.69 According to Rickert, Life can only be 
understood transcendentally from the intelligible rather than immanently from 
out of itself.70 In interpretive reflection (Besinnung) on history and the 
historicity of understanding, however, Dilthey shows how issues of facticity 
come to the fore in contrast with Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy as well 
as the »strong« holistic and teleological interpretation of history and society 
associated with Hegel and historicism. Dilthey already developed a powerful 
critique of these interconnected tendencies in the Introduction to the Human 
Sciences, and accordingly criticized the philosophy of history, in its 
metaphysical form, for the loss of value it enacts in reducing the past to the 
present and in treating it as only having value in relation to the present.71 
In the anti-historicity of this »presentism«, a charge already made early on 
against Schleiermacher, the past becomes an imperfect now and is temporality 
                                                 
68
 GS XVIII, 3. 
69
 Heinrich Rickert: Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft. Stuttgart 1986, 11. 
70
 Rickert, 1986, 11. 
71
 GS VIII, 129. 
17 
 
is leveled to the today.72 This is translated into the model of a linear series 
infinitely nearing perfection, or its constructed dialectical achievement in the 
absolute, in which the now is reduced to a series of identical now points. 
Dilthey opposed this model with the insight into historicity that undermines 
schemas imposed upon history, i.e., the facticity of history and the aporetic and 
antagonistic character of history. 
The aporia and antinomy, which signify the impossibility of an adequate or true 
unifying system, are not merely negative limits to knowledge. For Dilthey, they 
do not so much signify the conclusion or elimination of thought as they are 
productive of thinking itself.73 That is, as expressed in Dilthey’s later thought, 
history is not the positing or constructing of identity. It is conflict (Streit) and an 
irreconcilable conflict (Widerstreit) between heterogeneous and 
incommensurable forces and perspectives.74 In this encounter and confrontation 
with the facticity of history, understanding and interpretation only occur 
through the contingency, diversity, and tensions of social-historical life. 
Dilthey’s thinking of history is connected to the question of the time of past, 
present and future. Dilthey would both highlight and decenter the primacy of 
the present that dominates metaphysics and the sciences. Dilthey recognized 
that the past will always be approached through the interests and perspectives of 
the present: »We understand the past only through the present, that is, only so 
much of the past as is congenial to our present.75 Despite this necessity, Dilthey 
argued at different times for how the past should not be reduced to the present,76 
the present must be understood out of time rather than time out of the present,77 
and, more radically, that the present is never simply present to itself.78 This is 
not due to the timeless perspective of eternity. The present is always already 
self-displaced and self-distanced insofar as it is informed by a past and future 
that it cannot master. Feelings, for example, are not exclusively based in the 
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present. They can be oriented toward the future in fear and hope and can linger 
over the failures and successes of our past.79 
The multidimensionality of historical time resists the unity of the consciousness 
of time, which is itself always within time and history. History cannot be 
understood from the mere fact of or the character of human temporality. The 
future might not then be a continuation of the present, it is unknown and 
unexpected, and the past can never be fully recovered in its presence: »What is 
available to us is remnants, parts of the historical events of the past. We have 
heaps of ruins, fairy tales, customs, and a few reports about political affairs.«80 
The relation between historical event and historical material is not given but 
must be freely reconstructed.81 It requires reconstruction because, as Dilthey 
wrote elsewhere, the »silence of death lingers over the extended space of these 
ruins«.82 The question of reconstruction, as theoretically informed 
understanding and interpretation, forces the question of the possibility and 
character of Dilthey’s hermeneutics of historical life. 
5. Who understands better? Hermeneutics, Historicity, and the 
Other 
Dilthey’s thought is incompatible with traditional philosophy of history and the 
ordinary model of understanding that finds its primary expression in standard 
views such as Hegel’s idealism and Comte’s positivism. Understanding is 
commonly interpreted according to a model of »understanding better« that can 
be understood either as the appropriation of dialectics or as the tendency toward 
the unsaid and unthought of the author.83 »Understanding better« implies for 
Dilthey that we cannot simply remain within the self-understanding and self-
presentation of the other, since interpretation moves from these toward the 
unconscious, the language, and movement of thought of the other, none of 
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which are self-transparent.84 Accordingly, Dilthey concluded that »The ultimate 
goal of the hermeneutic process is to understand an author better than he 
understood himself. This is a principle that is the necessary consequence of the 
theory of unconscious creation.« 85 
Does the maxim of »understanding the author better than he understood 
himself,« which Dilthey took up from Kant and Schleiermacher, mean violating 
and mastering the other in subordinating alterity to one’s own identity? There 
are, of course, different ways of interpreting »understanding better.« Even for 
the early Dilthey, understanding cannot mean understanding the »most primitive 
self« of the other.86 We are not in the position to construct the original 
constitution of an individual, much less by means of isolating the individual as 
an isolated atom.87 Each individual is a world differentiated from every other88, 
such that each individual is both a receptive crossing point of social systems as 
well as an active co-agent in social-historical life.89 
Since one cannot reach the other, at least as other, through the schemas of 
induction or deduction, an alternative approach is demanded. The other is not 
primarily an »object of research,« but rather an individual who can be 
recognized and appreciated through one’s own openness and sense of 
possibilities. Relating to the other requires the reflectiveness of geniality and 
art, both of which are already implicitly at work in the practices of the nexus of 
historical life. It should be noted that art here does not means aesthetics or the 
result of the application of a pregiven rule or subsuming a particular under a 
concept. Art is a practice informed by self-reflection. 
Understanding is the way humans are involved and participate in life.90 As such, 
understanding is formative and requires cultivation. It is an art rather than 
method, the richness and plurality of lived-experience rather than mechanical 
rules. Further, understanding and its development in interpretation requires a 
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basic receptiveness to the other which challenges the reduction of the other to 
one’s own present. Thus, according to Dilthey, the richer and more multiple one 
is, the more possibilities are opened for access to the other and reproducing the 
other’s individuality.91 Understanding approaches the individual other indirectly 
through a preliminary overview of the whole such that the event of nearing the 
other, a nearing that never completely overcomes the temporal and spatial 
distance or interval (Abstand) criticized by Gadamer, can redefine that whole.92 
Understanding presupposes, on the hand, the vitality and virtuosity of the 
interpreter and, on the other hand, a yielding receptiveness to what or who is 
being interpreted. »The measure of understanding lies,« according to Dilthey, 
»in the vitality of the person« and »This vitality must be bound to a yielding to 
objects that is bound by facticity«.93 Understanding is bound to facticity. It is 
not purely intellectual and representational but tied to feeling and will which 
encounters the other as an irreducible, if not irremovable, force: »Precisely 
because each inner life is related to my life, it is there for me as a force − a force 
that limits my existence. Here, too, force is always active and productive, just as 
in external nature every process is conditioned by the lasting effects of pressure, 
impact, stimulus. My feeling of life is determined at every moment.«94 Self-
feeling and self-consciousness are conditioned by the surrounding medium of 
the world.95 
My existence, primarily given to me in my feeling of life, is determined by what 
is other than myself as much as it is active and productive. Activity is tied to 
passivity, spontaneity to receptivity. However, receptivity cannot be a pure 
passivity insofar as it must actively reach out toward the other. Receptivity 
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always presupposes spontaneity.96 Understanding − as the responsiveness of life 
− occurs in-between the self and the other, and as life between activity and 
passivity, spontaneity, and receptivity. 
The idea of interpretation in Dilthey does not follow the model of mastering the 
other or assimilation to one’s own, as it is neither intuition nor subsuming. 
Since it is not only based in the unity of representational concepts, interpretation 
cannot avoid the resistances of facticity, force, and materiality. Understanding is 
the movement toward the situation of the other.97 As such, it demands the 
activity of receptivity. Understanding cannot mean then the inclusion or 
assimilation of the other to one’s self or one’s own. It is rather it is constituted 
in the movement of an extension of myself toward (hin) the other through 
understanding »after« and »again« (the »nach« of Nachverständnis) and 
consequently, I would add, inherently »anew« because of the interval or 
distance (Abstand or Distanz) presupposed in the »nach«.98 In German, »nach« 
implies a repetition as does »wieder,« hence the translation of »nach-« as »re-«, 
yet this »nach« has a sense of temporal and spatial distance or interval that 
challenges the idea that this movement involves a recovery or repetition of 
identity or self-presence. »Nach« is always »after the fact.« The transposition 
between self and other operates as a process of translation and retranslation. For 
Dilthey, inevitably »transposition is transformation,« and alterity is an aporia 
that forces the transition from hermeneutics to the theory of knowledge, for 
which »possibility of grasping what is other or alien is one of the most profound 
epistemological problems.«99 
Dilthey transformed the hermeneutic notion of »understanding better« and its 
relation to purposiveness from Kant and Schleiermacher without, however, 
reducing it to the identity and assimilation of dialectic. I will argue, in addition, 
that Dilthey’s case is a departure from the »understanding better« that informs a 
determinate teleology of history as the realization of one pre-given goal, i.e., the 
dialectics that is a model in which what is other is either to be assimilated or 
excluded, mediated, or canceled (Aufhebung). 
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The »mediating« way of enacting understanding in dialectics refuses to put its 
own self-understanding at risk in encountering the other. Against such a risk of 
exposure to the depth of the other and the world, it reinstates narrative and 
teleological representation against its breakdowns, failures and limits. Every 
limit is to be »transgressed« in order to be »re-appropriated.« This 
»progressive« model privileges one moment of temporality over another 
according to a line of development in which the other is a »lesser version« of 
myself. History is interpreted in strong versions of teleology not according to its 
character as event and context. It prescribes a narrative of purpose proceeding 
from origin to goal (condition to result). It is a narrative that involves judging 
history through an assumption of superiority and privilege based on a 
teleological order that exists independently of temporal immanence. Dilthey did 
not reject categories such as progress, yet he did redefine them in relation to the 
present and its immanent temporality.100 This temporality does not imply a 
linear series infinitely nearing perfection, since the present is a conflict of 
forces, tendencies, and worldviews.101 The outcome is uncertain even as 
progress or multiple futures are projected on the basis of the present. In Kantian 
terms, this is done in order to reflectively orient practice. 
6. History and Purposiveness 
Dilthey investigated the step from the experience of purposiveness in human 
life to more determinate forms of teleology imposed upon the world, life, and 
history as such. He undertook a loosening of teleology by relating this form of 
explanation back to lived purposive structures.102 Dilthey continued to use 
words like »purpose« and »teleology« by analyzing them as moments immanent 
and relative to history and life. For example, both individuals and groups can be 
said to be purposive or teleological in being oriented toward goals. Dilthey 
abstracted teleological thinking from its metaphysical presuppositions and 
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related it back to experiences of the purposiveness in human life, as purposes lie 
exclusively within the realm of social-historical spirit.103 
Purposes occur in human life from going to the barber shop in order to get a hair 
cut (i.e., intentional goal-oriented individual activity) to the self-reproduction of 
the economy or government apparatus (i.e., organizations which reproduce 
themselves regardless of the intentions of individuals in a goal like manner or at 
least in a way that can be analyzed in purposive language). Dilthey analyzes 
»purposive systems« of culture and the external organization of society in 
functionalist terms.104 This accounts for the role of structural-functional 
strategies of social-scientific explanation in Dilthey’s philosophy of the human 
science and why Dilthey is sometimes taken as a forerunner of neofunctionalist 
systems theory. Functionalism, it should also be noted, presupposes not only 
collective unities but equally their differentiation. Dilthey could, like Durkheim, 
characterize modernity as an epoch of individuation.105 
Despite the purposiveness within life, life resists the positing of a hidden order, 
an ultimate determining goal or condition of explanation that would displace 
and hide the dimension of depth and hiddenness. In the displacement of this 
depth, to adopt the later Heidegger’s language, the very openness of life would 
be eliminated as its open singular-plural form (Gestalt) became an enclosing 
frame (Ge-stell). Life, as the virtual openness of possibilities, is not then a cause 
or principle in the sense of an efficient or teleological condition. Events are 
related to a nexus and context (Zusammenhang) without being exhausted by 
them; the »circle« of occurrence and context is not one in which event and 
context can be mediated. 
Understanding inevitably involves a sense of the unique106 and concerns a 
singular (Einzelnes), i.e., »the individual, not merely as an example of the 
human in general but as an individual whole«.107 Interpretation is a different 
way of relating to the world than explanation which reduces one phenomenon to 
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another (the singular to the type, the part to the whole). It is in non-identical 
relatedness that events and structures, individuals and types, come into word in 
articulating meaning.108 Thus the teleological character of a structural nexus is a 
form of »tendency toward striving according to purposes« (Zielstrebigkeit) 
rather than the realization of a determinate end given by either God or nature.109 
»Teleology« not only has a more indeterminate character in Dilthey’s thought. 
It has a further openness to a plurality of ends and to interruptions and 
transitions of purposiveness. 
Dilthey radically questioned the idea of totality as system striving according to 
one determinate goal, whether it is understood as a speculative actuality or a 
regulative demand. Dilthey calls for proceeding from the immanent 
experiences, self-interpretations, and analysis of life that leads and signifies 
beyond themselves in opposition to the construction of systems that are 
externally and schematically superimposed upon life.110 Likewise, Dilthey 
critiques the destruction of the historical nexus through totality, agreeing with 
critics of teleological history: »The grouping of particular data on the basis of a 
total idea of some historical period into a system everywhere destroys the nexus 
of basic causes and phenomena, and hence also the actual historical about which 
we are concerned, and substitutes for it a fictitious and abstract connection.«111 
From Dilthey’s work, the whole as an infinite depth and thus in a sense 
indeterminate context of relations can be distinguished from relative »wholes« 
or »totalities« of structural-functional systems of the external organization of 
society (economy and state), the realms of cultural reproduction (from ordinary 
life to the arts and sciences), and of the purposiveness of the person. A 
structural totality is a particular nexus within a wider context. This context is a 
changing one such that structural systems assume, fixate, or ignore their 
environment (their outside) with significant consequences. Even if the 
neofunctionalist »cybernetic« or »systems« theory of society explains society as 
a functional interaction between structural systems and larger environments that 
are never simply given, it is still committed only to explanatory holism and fails 
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to develop the interpretive and normative dimensions of individual and social 
life that Dilthey articulated. 
The hermeneutical »circle«, at work in his thought since his early study of 
hermeneutics, is neither a closed totality nor an enclosing speculative circle that 
explicates self-related meaning while re-appropriating every disruption of 
appropriation; nor can it be exclusively understood as the functionalist 
interaction of an organism (system) with its environment. Structural-
functionalist social science finds its justification in hermeneutics rather than 
viceversa. The hermeneutical circle occurs in the relation of and between the 
whole and the singular. It is therefore a relation of meaning and facticity rather 
than an explanation of an effect produced by a cause governed by a covering 
law. Both singular and context cannot be taken as completely determined by the 
other or reduced to one another through teleological, functional, or efficient 
explanation. 
The hermeneutical »circle« can be seen in the »as« character of understanding. 
The hermeneutical circle is not the speculative circle that subsumes the 
determined »part« under a determinate whole. For Dilthey, it is crucial to 
differentiate the knowledge of what is singular and that which is universal, and 
»remain aware that we can never allow what is singular to be fully submerged 
by what is universal«.112 Dilthey critiques historians such as Schlosser who 
directly evaluate every particular by a universal and fail »to recognize the worth 
and independence of individuals as well as nations«.113 Disfiguring the many-
sidedness of historical realities through one-sidedness is not a moral but a 
methodological failure.114 The imperative to preserve the singular arises from 
the historical consciousness that aims at a concrete or historical universal; i.e., 
»a universality that is always and everywhere bound to historical thought«.115 
Dilthey did not reject purposiveness or narrative in his critique of teleology. 
Purpose and the purposiveness of narrative, however, are rethought in relation 
to what resists and possibly reverses them. Life, history and society are not 
seamless closed totalities. They face their own incomprehensibility, 
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incommensurability, and indeterminacy. One is located in an immanent whole 
that is never fully immediate or transparent without the interruption and 
intervals of mediation.116 Such immanence lacks the immediacy and 
transparency of complete self-contained presence, as it involves a relatedness or 
»mediateness« without the closure and integration of totality and system. Life 
confronts me as always »mine« and yet − in its facticity, its finitude, and 
infinite depth − resists conceptualization and cognition.117 The mineness of life 
is an originary exposure to its basic non-originariness; that is, to facticity, 
singularity, and contingency.118 
7. Understanding, Interpretation, and Historicity 
The significance of the human sciences is situated in relation to a prescientific 
life-nexus and its forms of understanding. The understanding found in the 
human sciences is a derivative form informed by reflection. Yet the human 
sciences could not be what they are or function without the historicity and the 
life-nexus that they presuppose and the multiplicity of forms of reflection and 
inquiry that they involve: Considerations of epistemology, strategies of 
interpretation and explanation, questions of methodology, and the pursuit of 
theory. The distance (Abstand) that is thereby introduced is already operative in 
the everyday life-world itself. The nexus of life is neither self-transparent nor a 
continuous and seamless totality, its pretheoretical significance addresses us but 
it calls for a reflectively informed response. Contrary to both intellectualism and 
anti-intellectualism, such methodological and theoretical considerations do not 
make up the whole of understanding nor are the human sciences and empirical 
research external to questions of understanding. Dilthey’s philosophy of the 
human sciences proceeds through an »interpretive phenomenology« of 
historical consciousness and the life to which consciousness is bound. It both 
anticipates Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity and suggests a significant 
alternative to it. 
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Dilthey’s account of understanding, interpretation, and the life-world or 
nexus − in which these occur − implies both the holism and individualism of 
ordinary understanding and its cultivated form in the human sciences. In the 
philosophy of the social sciences, holism and individualism are typically 
categorized as contradictory positions. The questions we need to address here 
are: (1) how can an emphasis on the individual still be social-historical, (2) how 
is it that multiplicity and plurality are in some sense a whole, and (3) how is 
holism still perspectival?119 
The individual is essentially social-historical and worldly, i.e., is always 
contextual and relational, such that this relationality needs to be explored rather 
than reduced to an abstract atomistic individual (as is done in contemporary 
methodological individualism such as rational choice theory) or to society as an 
integrated systematic totality without residue (as is done in the methodological 
collectivism of organic, functionalist and structuralist approaches to society). 
Social-historical reality cannot be reduced to the isolated individual or structure 
because both are always mediated through the intersubjectivity of the life-nexus 
which reproduces itself through communication (expression and understanding). 
Methodological individualism and collectivism are legitimate strategies of 
inquiry for Dilthey’s methodological pluralism as long as the limits and 
presuppositions of both are recognized. Instead of Habermas’ twofold approach 
of system and life-world, Dilthey developed the threefold relationality of 
individual, systems, and life-nexus. 
The lived connectedness of individuality, social structures and life context 
indicates the possibility of coordinating interpretation and explanation: That is, 
the interpretive first person perspective, both plural and singular, with the 
explanatory third person perspective, both individual and collective. Dilthey 
never rejected this third person perspective; he situated it in the context of the 
categories of life and social-historical life. Further, »there are no fixed 
boundaries between interpretation and explanation, only differences in 
degree«.120 There is a role in Dilthey’s thought for both efficient causality, 
which subsumes particulars under governing laws, and the social causality, 
                                                 
119 GS V, 40. 
120 GS V, 336 / SW IV, 255. 
28 
 
which subordinates particulars to governing functional systems and structures. 
These are, however, subordinated to the interpretive context of human life. 
Dilthey’s methodological pluralism provides the means for addressing questions 
of who and how as well as what and why. Interpretation asks questions of who 
and how rather than explaining a what through a why. It brings to light the 
relations and the between of the singular and its context or »whole,« of the 
individual and its milieu. The primacy of understanding and interpretation, 
however, undermines the reification of theoretical-explanatory approaches to 
social-historical life. Hermeneutics indicates the interrelation of the singular and 
the universal, and thus »the theory of interpretation becomes an important 
connecting link between philosophy and the historical sciences.«121 The relation 
of the singular and the universal, the individual and its context, is opposed to the 
hypostatization of explanation in metaphysics that demands a reduction of the 
singular and the infinite to an ultimate unitary ground behind or beyond life; 
whether this ground be conceived rationalistically as reason, cause, principle, 
and archē or more non-rationally as the mystical and ineffable. 
Dilthey distinguished interpretation and explanation as varieties of scientific 
discourse without suggesting that they can be completely separated. 
Understanding and interpretation cannot then be made into a fundamental 
discipline that can ignore empirical and explanatory modes of inquiry. The 
human sciences are sciences of individuals and groups, including interpretive 
(i.e., related to the significance and facticity of the life-nexus) and explanatory 
(i.e., efficient and functional-structural) approaches to both. For Dilthey, the 
objects of the human sciences − which include individuals and groups; habits, 
customs, and traditions; actions, practices, institutions, and structures − require 
the use and coordination of both explanation and interpretation in their holistic, 
structural-functional, and individualistic forms. This methodological pluralism, 
a pluralism incompatible with robust holism and a strong teleology that sets one 
determinate function or end, informs his thought from his early conception of a 
critique of historical reason (or judgment) to the hermeneutics of historical life 
unfolded in his later works. 




Even as Dilthey is indebted to concepts and strategies from Hegel, he critiques 
his metaphysical absolutism, political statism, and overwhelming holism. The 
whole is not a systematic totality or identity; it is a singular-plural event and 
structure (i.e., nexus). Totality for Dilthey does not mean final identity or unity 
but the infinite complexity which escapes and withdraws from the legitimate 
striving for identity and unity. The singular-plural character of life, the 
empiricity and virtuality of its possibilities, are life as a intertwined whole 
insofar as life itself is the »between« and self-distanced spacing of self and 
other and singular and whole. The whole is thus the infinite complexity and 
richness of possibilities that resist being reduced to the finality of one 
teleological potential. The whole is multiple and plural such that it is never fully 
a determinate or systematic totality. 
Interpretation is inevitably limited by the conditions of its own activity and is 
finite in relation to the infinite complexity and fullness of what is to be 
interpreted. The whole can be anticipated through a sense of the whole, yet 
receptivity alters and revises that sense. The sense of the whole is fluid rather 
than fixed and altered and revised in encountering the different, the new, and 
the other. The life-nexus and life itself present themselves as wholes, yet 
knowledge as analytic and procedural is partial and incomplete. The whole can 
never be completely or systematically expressed without antinomy and aporia. 
In this case, understanding and knowledge are always already referred to further 
contexts and wholes without being able to reduce or systematize them. Human 
understanding is finite and perspectival because of the holistic character of 
psychological and historical life. 
Understanding can take on a self-reflective form and create unity out of 
multiplicity only in reference to the expressions and manifestations of life, yet 
such unity of reflection is not the unity of life. »Life« is not given in its 
immanent givenness, it is indeterminate in its determinacy, and »brought forth« 
and is therefore enacted and lived as historical. »Life« can only be indirectly 
addressed, intimated, and expressed through the movement of reflection 
between itself and the world, and is consequently »historical life«. Moving from 
and back toward itself without a predetermined or ultimate terminus, there is no 
adequate way for the self to isolate a subject or object as a substance or essence 




Dilthey did not respond to the reification and abstraction of modern 
epistemology by dismissing or excluding it.122 Instead of taking the »ontological 
turn«, Dilthey rethought epistemology in relation to its context historical life. 
The reason for this is that methodological and theoretical considerations cannot 
be avoided for the sake of a pure description or disclosure that would be able to 
explicate life from itself without the distance and mediation that reflection, 
theory, and methodology introduce. Distance, interval, and difference can occur 
at different levels of the constitution of meaning such that the community, 
ethical life, and tradition have their own facticity and lack of coherency and 
transparency. This facticity entails for Dilthey the need to both interpret and 
empirically investigate that characterizes the human sciences and, further, that 
the whole can only be glimpsed perspectivally. 
Historical understanding and interpretive reflection are formed and confronted, 
on the one hand, by the inherent pre-theoretical significance of historical life 
and, on the other, the interruption of significance in experiences of the 
intractable. There are experiences in which the ungroundability 
(Unbegründbarkeit) and unfathomability (Unergründlichkeit) that disturbs and 
threatens the establishment and organization of knowledge, validity, and value 
are glimpsed, and thought needs to return to the senses, imagination, and its 
own life-context − insofar as it can − in order to respond. This is not 
»irrational« but the very self-generation and articulation of rationality from life. 
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 On Dilthey’s transformation of epistemology, see Nelson: Interpreting Practice: 
Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Historical Life in Dilthey, in: Idealistic Studies, 38:1-2 
(2008), 105-122. 
